Taiwan’s Military Complacency Could Undermine U.S. Support
By Regan Chong
U.S. President Donald Trump’s bold assertion that U.S. B-2 stealth bombers had “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s nuclear facilities briefly prompted discussion in Taiwan about the credibility of American military support—specifically, whether a similar U.S. response could be expected if Taiwan faced a Chinese blockade or invasion. While public sentiment remained grounded, many viewed Trump’s swift response as encouraging and reassuring. However, such a perception of reassurance risks fostering complacency about the nature and limits of Washington’s commitments to Taiwan.
Some in Taiwan drew comparisons to the Israel–Iran conflict, but these parallels are misleading. Taiwan’s security situation is shaped by distinct cultural and geopolitical realities that make such analogies problematic.
Unlike Israelis, who often view military service as a civic duty tied to national identity, many Taiwanese remain culturally disinterested in conscription, leaving Taiwan’s conscription system plagued by low morale and limited public esteem. As a result, the military faces persistent understaffing, with recruitment for contract servicemen faltering and military academies struggling to fill seats. This cultural attitude—shaped by traditional Confucian preferences for scholarly pursuits over martial ones—contributes to recurring draft evasion scandals, generating headlines such as “Celebrity draft-dodging scandal lays bare problems with Taiwan’s crucial reservist force.”
The contrast with Israel is stark. In Israel, military service—mandatory for both men and women—not only symbolizes patriotism but also boosts career prospects, especially for veterans of elite or technical units. Employers value the skills, discipline, and networks gained, particularly in the tech and security sectors.
This Taiwanese cultural reluctance to embrace military service raises serious concerns—not just for Taiwan’s own defense, but for its ability to garner international support in the event of a Chinese invasion. Speaking at a civilian war-gaming event in Taipei on June 11, 2025, former U.S. Pacific Command chief Admiral Dennis Blair stated that U.S. intervention becomes "much more likely" when Taiwan demonstrates both the ability and willingness to defend itself. Likewise, in a New Statesman interview published on July 2, 2024, defense strategist Elbridge Colby explicitly tied U.S. intervention to Taiwan’s will to fight. These remarks reflect a growing consensus among American defense experts: U.S. support is conditional. Washington is far more likely to act if Taiwan first proves both its willingness and capability to fight.
Iran has struggled for decades in its attempts to develop nuclear weapons, while China already possesses a sophisticated nuclear triad and commands the economic heft to impose significant costs on the United States. A strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, ostensibly in support of Israel, could be framed as a limited and containable military operation. Escalation in the Taiwan Strait, however, would represent a far more perilous scenario—militarily, economically, and strategically—raising the specter of global destabilization.
Historical precedent underscores a consistent geopolitical logic: nuclear-armed powers tend to avoid direct confrontation, opting instead to engage through proxies. This logic of strategic restraint also informs current U.S. foreign policy, which favors calibrated interventions where risks and costs appear manageable, while steering clear of prolonged entanglements. It’s a lesson learned from Cold War conflicts like the Vietnam War (1965–1973) as well as more recent engagements such as the U.S.–Afghan War (2001–2021) where costs far outweighed strategic gains.
Historical analogies further illustrate the limits of U.S. commitments. The U.S. withdrawal from the Vietnam War (1965–1973) was driven by mounting American casualties, intense domestic anti-war sentiment, and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement through the Paris Peace Accords—all reflecting a shift in U.S. national priorities. Similarly, the U.S. disengaged from the Republic of China in 1949 and again in 1979, first withdrawing military support during the Chinese Civil War, then switching diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China to gain a Cold War advantage.
Similarities between South Vietnam then and Taiwan today are striking: both face existential threats from communist neighbors, suffer internal divisions (military instability in South Vietnam, political polarization in Taiwan), and depend heavily on U.S. military support. In both cases, American commitment has shown signs of fragility—seen in the withdrawals of U.S. combat troops from Vietnam by 1973, and in U.S. President Donald Trump’s blunt, transactional remarks in 2019 suggesting that Taiwan must pay for American protection.
Complacency in Taiwan is also sustained by optimistic assessments—such as the “low probability of an imminent Chinese invasion” (a view recently challenged by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth) and the belief that China currently lacks the capability to execute an amphibious assault on Taiwan. This misplaced sense of security is further fueled by limited awareness of the mixed record of U.S. intelligence. Though the U.S. correctly predicted Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it failed to anticipate the Korean War in 1950 and the fall of Saigon in 1975.
A Central Intelligence Bulletin, a classified publication by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), dated June 23, 1950—just two days before North Korea invaded South Korea—stated that a large-scale attack was possible but not certain. While the CIA recognized escalating tensions, it did not confidently forecast an imminent invasion in the days leading up to June 25, 1950.
The completion of the U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam on March 29, 1973, was followed by U.S. government statements affirming confidence in the defensive capabilities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
In his televised address on March 29, 1973, President Richard Nixon emphasized that the ARVN had the strength to protect South Vietnam following the U.S. troop withdrawals. During congressional hearings in 1973 and 1974 on aid to Vietnam, U.S. officials testified about confidence in the ARVN’s ability to defend South Vietnam.
A U.S. embassy cable dated April 7, 1975, reported that earlier intelligence assessments did not view a North Vietnamese victory as inevitable, noting that the ARVN had reconstituted several divisions capable of maintaining defensive positions.
Even in the final days before the fall of Saigon, General William Westmoreland commended the ARVN’s defensive efforts, describing their tactical withdrawals as prudent and affirming that the ARVN had the courage to stop an overwhelmingly superior force. Meanwhile, Ambassador Graham Martin maintained faith in the ARVN’s ability to hold out, resisting evacuation efforts and insisting that additional aid might still stabilize the situation.
The fall of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, into the hands of the Taliban on August 15, 2021, has barely aged into history’s archives. In early 2021, U.S. intelligence acknowledged the Taliban as a mounting threat but underestimated the speed of the Taliban’s advance. Kabul fell to the Taliban in just a matter of weeks—far sooner than the expected period of at least six months.
Taiwan’s path to security must begin at home. Combat capabilities and semiconductor dominance are important, but they’re not enough. Visible commitment to national defense—through improved readiness, public engagement, and military reform—is essential. Complacency is not just a strategic liability; it’s a barrier to the very support Taiwan seeks from its allies.
If Taiwan expects the world to stand with it in a time of crisis, it must first stand up for itself.
Regan Chong is a Hong Konger advocating for Hong Kong’s independence from China and a contact person for the Hong Konger Front.
